context used here differs somewhat from LeRoy's, however, and the analytical methods used differ considerably. The economy is informally described in the next section, and equilibrium is formally defined in Section 3. In Section 4, the basic functional equation for prices is derived and studied. Section 5 develops a certain "duality" property, on which is based the discussion of stability in Section 6. Section 7 deals with examples which are simple enough to permit either explicit solution or some "comparative static" exercises. The role of the Martingale property is discussed in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMY
Consider an economy with a single consumer, interpreted as a representative "stand in" for a large number of identical consumers. He wishes to maximize the quantity Ownership in these productive units is determined each period in a competitive stock market. Each unit has outstanding one perfectly divisible equity share. A share entitles its owner as of the beginning of t to all of the unit's output in period t. Shares are traded, after payment of real dividends, at a competitively determined price vector Pt = (PIt . . . , Pnt). Let zt = (Zlt. . . Znt) denote a consurner's beginning-of-period share holdings.
In this economy, it is easy to determine equilibrium quantities of consumption and asset holdings. All output will be consumed (ct = :iyit) and all shares will be held (z, (1, 1, . . . 1)= 1 for all t). The main analytical issue, then, will be the determination of equilibrium price behavior.
Our attack on this problem begins from the observation that all relevant information on the current and future physical state of the economy is sum-marized in the current output vector y. Since, given recursive preferences, the asset market "solves" a problem of the same form each period, equilibrium prices should (if they behave in a systematic way at all) be expressible as some fixed function p( ) of the state of the economy, or p,= p(y,) where the ith coordinate pi(y,) is the price of a share of unit i when the economy is in the state y,. If so, knowledge of the transition function F(y', y) and this function p(y) will suffice to determine the stochastic character of the price process {p,}.
Similarly, one would expect a consumer's current consumption and portfolio decisions, c, and z,,1, to depend on his beginning of period portfolio, z, the prices he faces, p,, and the relevant information he possesses on current and future states of the economy, y, If so, his behavior can be described by fixed decision rules c(-) and g(-): c, = c(z,, yt, pt) and zt+1 = g(zt, Yt, Pt). Now given perceived, future price behavior F(y', y) and p(y), consumers will be able to determine these decision rules c( ) and g( ) optimally. In this sense, a price function p determines consumer behavior. On the other hand, given decision rules c( ) and g( ), the current period market clearing conditions determine a price function p( ). In this sense, consumer behavior determines the equilibrium price function. We close the system with the assumption of rational expectations: the market clearing price function p implied by consumer behavior is assumed to be the same as the price function p on which consumer decisions are based.
DEFINITION OF EQUILIBRIUM
The economy described in the preceding section is specified by the functions U and F and the number ,B. Assume 0 < 3 < 1. U: R + --R + is continuously differentiable, bounded, increasing, and strictly concave, with U(0)= 0.' F: E`'+ x En R is continuous; F(-, y) is a distribution function for each fixed y, with F(O, y)= 0. Assume that the process defined by F has a stationary distribution f(-), the unique solution to (y') F E(y',y)dq (y), and that for any continuous function g(y),
is a continuous function of y. An equilibrium will be a pair of functions: a price function p(y), as discussed above, and an optimum value function v(z, y). The value v(z, y) will be interpreted as the value of the objective (1) for a consumer who begins in state y with holdings z, and follows an optimum consumption-portfolio policy thereafter. 2Rt is the set of nonnegative real numbers. En is n-dimensional space. E" is the subset of En with all components nonnegative (xE EE and x -0). LU is the set of continuous, bounded functions with domain En, and so on. Condition (i) says that, given the behavior of prices, a consumer allocates his resources y z+p(y) z optimally among current consumption c and end-ofperiod share holdings X.3 Condition (ii) requires that these consumption and portfolio decisions be market clearing. Since the market is always cleared, the consumer will never be observed except in the state z = 1. On the other hand, the consumer has (though he always rejects it) the option to choose security holdings x # 1. To evaluate these options, he needs to know v(z, y) for all Z. 4 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
We begin by studying the consumer's maximum problem (i) for given price behavior p(y). We have the following proposition. The proof follows from the fact that Ti is a contraction, verified as in the proof of Proposition 1. In summary, we have learned that there is exactly one equilibrium price function for this economy, and we have in (6) (equivalently in (7) and (8)) an equation useful in characterizing it. In the next two sections, we develop further results at this "general" level, and then turn to the study of the nature of equilibrium prices in special cases.
For each A, f (A) is attained at c(A), x (A) say, and since the maximand is strictly concave in c, c(A) is unique and varies continuously with A [2, p. 116]. If c (A)> 0 and if h is sufficiently small, c (A)+ h is feasible at "income" A + h, and c (A + h) -h is feasible at income A. Thus f(A + h) u(c(A)+ h)+,3Jv(x(A), y') dF (y', y) = u(c(A)+ h)-u(c(A))+ f(A) and f(A)> u(c(A +h)-h)+,4v(x(A +h), y', y) -u(c(A + h)-h)-u(c(A + h))+f(A + h).

Combining these inequalities gives U(c(A)+ h)-U(c(A))-< f(A + h)-f (A)
Dividing
A "DUALITY THEOREM"
There is a second way to construct the equilibrium price function, as will be shown in this section. Since the preceding section already provides one way, this method appears somewhat redundant in the present context. The second method is slightly more general however (since it does not require differentiability of U); it is also suggestive for stability theory.
Consider the functional equation , then a convex combination of these two points is feasible for problem (13) and yields a higher value to the objective function (since r is concave in z and U is strictly concave) contradicting the assumption that (co, x?) solves problem (13).
STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIUM
The preceding sections showed that there is only one way for the economy under study to be in competitive equilibrium: when all output is consumed, all asset shares are held, and asset prices follow (6), or equivalently, solve the dynamic program (10). As always, there are innumerable ways for the economy to be out of equilibrium, so we must expect any treatment of out-of-equilibrium behavior to have considerable arbitrariness, not resolvable by economic reasoning. On the other hand, the model described above "assumes" that agents know a great deal about the structure of the economy, and perform some non-routine computations. It is in order to ask, then: will an economy with agents armed with "sensible" rules-of-thumb, revising these rules from time to time so as to claim observed rents, tend as time passes to behave as described in Sections 4 and 5?
To sharpen this loosely posed question somewhat, let us recognize at least three different stability questions raised by this model, and dispose of two of them at once. First, in each period an ordinary "static" market clearing occurs, in which current asset prices are set. Since stability in this sense is well understood, we need add nothing here except the assumption that it always obtains. Second, agents may be in ignorance of the distribution F(y', y) of the exogenous production shocks, and learn its characteristics only gradually. Stability in this sense, too, is a well understood problem in Bayesian decision theory [5, Ch. 10] and need not be discussed here. Finally, consumers may be in error as to the price function, or equivalently, about the distribution of future prices conditional on the current state, or again equivalently, about the way they wish to evaluate their end-of-period portfolio, x. We focus here on this last kind of disequilibrium.
The "correct" way, given preferences, to evaluate an end-of-period portfolio x is to use the equilibrium value function v: fv(x, y') dF (y', y), but agents must know this, and the economy must be in equilibrium for this valuation to be correct. Suppose instead that agents use some other function u(z, y), say, where u is continuous, concave, and increasing in z, but otherwise arbitrary, so that an end-of-period portfolio x is valued at fu(x, y') dF (y', y). (To retain the conveniences of the representative consumer device, we are forced to treat all agents as being wrong in the same way.) Suppose on the basis of this arbitrary portfolio evaluation formula, asset demands are drawn and a current period market clearing asset price vector q is es-tablished, at which c = 1i'i and x = 1.
Now if prices are established in this fashion, what will be the realized utility yields experienced by agents?
The answer is given by the function (Mu)(z, y), where M is the operator defined in association with equation (10) . That this is so is the content of Proposition 5: the price q which attains the right side of (10) is precisely that price which clears markets, given the portfolio valuation function u.
If this experience is utilized by agents, they will replace the initial valuation u with the value Mu actually experienced, then new prices will be established, and utilities M2u experienced, and so on.5 Since, as shown in the preceding section, M-u -v, where v is the equilibrium value function, prices will converge to the equilibrium price function. In short, the successive approximations used in Section 5 constitute a kind of stability theory.
It is worth emphasizing that the adjustment toward equilibrium described by these successive approximations does not presuppose that agents are familiar with the theory of Markov processes or of dynamic programming; nor need agents in equilibrium be particularly skilled at responding to survey questions about future price movements. All that is required is they have consistent preferences for consumption and asset holdings (which would seem necessary for dealing in asset markets at all) and that they revise these preferences in the direction of the consumption utility actually yielded by their asset holdings.
The point of this section, it should also be said, is not that one would use any of the successive approximations Mnu as a description of observed behavior. (This suggestion is not even operational, since u was arbitrarily chosen.) It is rather to argue that there is a theoretical reason for expecting the equilibrium to be a good approximation to behavior. Certainly one would not expect to capture the creativity which is devoted to discovering and gaining from disequilibria in actual economies in any mechanical approximation routine. 5As one of the referees for this paper emphasized, the process by which u is "replaced" by Mu, Mu by M2u, and so forth, might well be quite complicated to spell out. It involves "learning" a function over time by experiencing discrete values of the function Mu at arguments partly selected by the household (z) and partly by nature (y). There are many ways to formulate learning of this sort; for our purposes here, it seems simpler just to assume that households are good at it.
EXAMPLES
Linear Utility
The case of constant marginal utility of consumption does not exactly fit the assumptions of Section 3 (it violates boundedness) but is easily handled separately, and is a useful point of departure. In this case, equation (6) reduces to (14) pi ( 
S=1
That is, the price of the ith asset is the expected, discounted present value of its real dividend stream, conditioned on current information y.
One Asset
It is easy to use equation (6) (or (7) That is, the elasticity of price with respect to income is equal to the Arrow-Pratt [1] measure of relative risk aversion. In a period of high transitory income, then, agents attempt to distribute part of the windfall over future periods, via securities purchases. This attempt is frustrated (since storage is precluded) by an increase in asset prices.
Next, we consider autocorrelated production disturbances, under a restriction which amounts to requiring that the stochastic difference equation governing Yt have its root between zero and one: assume that F is differentiable, and that its derivatives F1 and F2 satisfy (15) 0<-F2 <F1.
We will repeatedly apply the following lemma. The second term on the right of (20) is the "income effect" we have seen above; it is positive. The first term might be called the "information effect";7 it has the sign of f'(y). Evidently, the use one can make of these formulas depends on our knowledge of the curvature of U; (19) and (20) show how to translate such knowledge into knowledge about asset prices.
In the present case of relative risk aversion8 less than unity, we have found in (19) that f'(y)> 0, so that the information effect is positive. Thus as one might expect, new optimistic information on future dividends leads to increased asset prices. (Of course, one might also expect that this information will lead to an attempted consumption binge now, lowering asset prices!) Observationally, the derivative p'(y) is the change in the ratio of a comprehensive stock price index to the CPI, as real output varies. Even in the simplified economy under study, then, the relationship of asset prices to real output is far from simple and possibly not even monotonic. Perhaps it has been good judgment, not merely timidity, which has led aggregate theorists to steer clear of any attempt to "understand the market." 7This follows Grossman [8] . 8 In this multiperiod context, the term "risk aversion" is perhaps misleading, since the curvature of U also governs the intertemporal substitutability of consumption. With time-additive utility, there is no way to disentangle these conceptually distinct aspects of preferences. If we think of a sequence of economies of the same total size, but with more and more independent productive units, of roughly equal size, var (y jyi) and Ai -plYi) will tend to zero, and the approximations fi will become close.
THE MARTINGALE PROPERTY
We have shown that equation (6) If the terms U'(Iiy1t) do not vary much, either because agents are indifferent -to risk (example 7.1) or because there is little aggregate risk (example 7.3), then securities prices properly "corrected" for dividends Yit almost have the property but not without another "correction" for the discount factor jl. In any case, neither rationale for a constant U'(X1y1t) seems likely to closely approximate reality.
It should be added that the importance of the requirement that "the conditions of market equilibrium can be stated in terms of expected returns" has been repeatedly emphasized by Fama and other efficient market theorists; it is not a new result from this paper. What is new, I think, is an explicit framework within which one can judge what this requirement means and whether or not it is satisfied, or which in other words can lend some insight into the conditions under which the Martingale property is likely to approximately describe a price series. Within this framework, it is clear that the presence of a diminishing marginal rate of substitution of future for current consumption is inconsistent with this property.9 9 . CONCLUSIONS What can be concluded from this exercise (beyond the observation that a little knowledge of geometric series goes a long way, or perhaps, is a dangerous thing)? Substantively, the discussion of stability of Section 6 indicates that the applicability of the hypothesis that agents "know" the "true" probability distributions of future prices has little to do with the question of whether agents (ourselves included) think of, or describe, their behavior in these terms. A relatively crude use of hindsight, applied in a reasonably stationary physical environment, will lead to behavior well-approximated by rational expectations.
With respect to the random character of stock prices, it is evident that one can construct rigorous economic models in which price series have this characteristic10 and ones with equally rational and well-informed agents in which they do not. This would suggest that the outcomes of tests as to whether actual price series have the Martingale property do not in themselves shed light on the generally posed issue of market "efficiency."
In the main, however, this paper is primarily methodological: an illustration of the use of some methods which may help to bring financial and economic theories closer together. It may help, then, to close with some guesses as to the fronts on which further progress can be expected.
The time-additive preference structure is, as remarked earlier, a nuisance, and it has no rationale beyond tractability. It would not be difficult (with the aid of [6] ) to use recursive, but non-additive preferences of the Koopmans-DiamondWilliamson [9] type, provided sufficient "impatience" is assumed.
Second, one would like to introduce capital accumulation. In this regard, the marginal analysis of Section 4 is probably a dead-end: equation (6) is a kind of Euler condition, and will necessarily involve capital provided capital enters the model in a non-trviial way. Aside from special cases (such as the one studied in Section 4) stochastic Euler equations are not likely to be of value in constructing solutions. Equation (10) in Section 5 appears more promising; perhaps it has useful analogues in more generally formulated models.
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